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PRESENT TRENDS AMONG JIHADISTS 
AFTER THE ARAB SPRING
Post-revolutionary environment
The Arab Spring created three main trends in current political Islam. The ﬁ rst ﬁ eld 
concerns oﬃ  cial Muslim parties declaring implementation of some Islamic values 
in legal, constitutional and social life. They resign from violence and accept politi-
cal dialogue and mechanisms such as free elections, referendum or parliamentary 
activities. The second factor reﬂ ects Salaﬁ  preaching and radical ideas preserving 
conservative traditions from the period of the Prophet Mohammad. Salaﬁ  groups 
are focused on their theological teaching, charity work and popularization of moral 
values among societies. The third category concerns jihadist organizations that dec-
lare violence and ﬁ ght against authorities and societies. They refer to the concept of 
takfīr (excommunication), which considers the state and the society as a sinful and 
atheistic group supporting immoral and corrupted governments. Moreover, the idea 
of takfīr is close to Al-Qaeda activities regarding violent renaissance of historic 
caliphate and implementation of strict sharia rules. Al-Qaeda also adapts defensive 
and oﬀ ensive sense of jihad to modern political context related to Western policy 
in the Muslim world.
The victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salaﬁ  groups in parliamentary 
elections in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, the presidency of Mohammad Mursi as 
XI
: 2
01
4 n
r 3
26 MARCIN STYSZYŃSKI
well as control of main regions in Libya and Syria by extremist militias increased 
inﬂ uences of radical Islam in post-revolutionary countries.1
However, after three years of the transition process Arab societies have 
changed their attitude to the crucial values of the Arab revolution such as democra-
cy, freedom, liberalism or ﬁ ght against authoritarianism. Egyptian, Tunisian, Alge-
rian or Iraqi and Libyan societies started to compare those ideas to chaos, destabi-
lization, terrorism and economic crisis. Public opinion in the Arab world invented 
a new deﬁ nition: kharīf ’arabī (Arab autumn), which replaces the positive me-
anings of the Arab Spring. The implementation of secular or military governments 
and banning of Islamist organizations provoked concerns among militants and le-
aders, who sustained their negative and antagonistic reactions or declared coopera-
tion with new authorities.
For instance, some Salaﬁ  movements reinterpreted the loyalty to the gov-
ernment based on the concept of khurūj ’an al-ḥākim (opposition to the ruler). 
The idea reﬂ ects the philosophy of conservative Muslim scholars like Abu Hani-
fa, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal or Ibn Taymiyya and Abd al-Wahhab, who ordered loyal-
ty and cooperation with caliphs and emirs representing Umma (Muslim Nation).2 
Disobedience to the ruler is allowed in case of sinful and corrupted behavior of 
the authority. However, the negative opinions about the Caliph must be elaborated 
carefully by diﬀ erent theologians who issue common legal judgments (ar. fatwa). 
The following examples show the implementation of the philosophy in the current 
political circumstances.
The general Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi encouraged some radical Muslim leaders 
to participate in his symbolic speech declaring the overthrow of Muslim Broth-
erhood’s power in Egypt. Positive feedback was declared by Nour (Light) party, 
which refers to Salaﬁ  ideology and long preaching activity called Da’wa salafi yya 
(Salaﬁ  Call).3 Nour played an important role after the collapse of Mubarak’s regime 
and it became the second political power after Freedom and Justice party aﬃ  liated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. Besides, Salaﬁ  representatives supported Al-Sisi’s 
presidential campaign by issuing theological manifestos and fatwas justifying the 
policy of the army and glorifying the candidate for the presidency. Nour’s key 
ﬁ gures stated that Al-Sisi assures Muslim identity of the society and he guaranties 
security and stability of the state after a long period of demonstrations, clashes, 
political turmoil and economic crisis.
Similar trends concern some religious leaders in Maghreb. For instance, 
the radical Sheikh Mohammad Fizazi from Morocco represented extremist ideas 
against authorities. He was suspected of inspiring Casablanca terrorist attack in 
2003 when 45 people were killed as a result of suicide bombings in the popular 
1 More about the Arab Spring and current political tendencies in the Arab world see: J. Zdanow-
ski, Bliski Wschód, bunt czy rewolucja?, Kraków 2011.
2 Nazīr al-Khazrājī, Ashari’at al-bayān, Bayrūt 2011, p. 277–286.
3 www.alquds.co.uk/?p=171339&print=1 [accessed 20.08.2014].
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restaurant.4 Sheikh Fizazi was arrested and imprisoned for 30 years. However, after 
8 years he was released and demonstrated a dramatic change in his attitude to the 
Moroccan monarchy. He called the king Mohammad VI: Amīr al-mu’minīn (The 
Emir of all emirs). The meaning reﬂ ects a notable title popularized in the Muslim 
tradition and Arab-Muslim empires. Sheikh Fizazi refused violence and underlined 
some conservative moral values of the state. He also legitimatised the religious iden-
tity of the monarchy and its social policy.5
Moreover, the Libyan case pays attention as well. Abdelhakim Belhaj the 
veteran of the Libyan resistance during Gaddaﬁ ’s regime and an important member 
of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group aﬃ  liated with Al-Qaeda Central established 
a new party Waṭan (Nation). He resigned from radical religious demands and opted 
for a new state based on regional and nationalist or patriotic values. He participat-
ed in reunions of The National Transitional Council of Libya and then the Libyan 
General National Congress.6 The reconciliation feedback has been also expressed 
recently by Algerian Islamic Salvation Front – FIS banned after the parliamentary 
elections in 1991 and terrorist campaign against secular and military forces. The 
ex-FIS leader Abdelkader Boukhamkham participated in meetings regarding nego-
tiations on the new constitution and future cooperation with the government. The 
debate was also accepted by the key ﬁ gures of the Salaﬁ  movements like Madani 
Mezrag or Al-Hashimi Sahnouni.7
In fact, the loyalty gives a chance of peaceful implementation of some sharia 
values into constitutions and social life of each country. It also enables to conduct 
preaching activities and to receive ﬁ nancial and political support from the govern-
ment. Besides, the new secular leaders gain religious and ideological legitimization, 
which decreases inﬂ uences of opposition, including extremist organizations like 
Al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaida Central
The death of Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaida’s leaders like Anwar Awlaqi or 
Abu Yahia al-Libi as well as political activities of Islamic groups during the Arab 
Spring have aﬀ ected structures, activities and strategy of the organization.
4 M. Lahcen, “Morocco remembers 2003 Casablanca attacks”, Magharebia, 17 May 2013, 
www.magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/reportage/2013/05/17/reportage-01 [accessed 20.08.2014].
5 H. Barrada, “Mohamed Fizazi le salaﬁ ste de sa majeste”, Jeune Afrique, 11 Avril 2014, 
www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2778p050.xml0/ [accessed 20.08.2014].
6 J.-P. Perrin, “Abdelhakim Belhaj, le retour d’al-Qaeda”, Liberation, 26 Aout 2011, www.
liberation.fr/monde/2011/08/26 [accessed 20.09.2014].
7 H. Guenanfa, “Révision de la Constitution: invité par Ouyahia, un ex-dirigeant du FIS refuse de 
participer aux consultations”, Tout sur l’Algerie – TSA, 1 juin 2014, www.tsa-algerie.com/2014/06/01/
revision-de-la-constitution-invite-par-ouyahia-un-ex-dirigeant-du-ﬁ s-refuse-de-participer-aux-consulta-
tions/ [accessed 20.08.2014].
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Al-Qaida referred to the transition process in the Arab world and considered 
it as a new challenge facilitating the implementation of rigorous religious ideas. 
Ayman al-Zawahiri released diﬀ erent manifestos and statements elaborating the 
new political atmosphere in the region.8 For instance, he applied some symbolic 
meanings appeared during the revolution such as thawra (revolution), ḥurriyya (lib-
erty) ’adāla ijtimā’iyya (social justice) or sha’b (people) and shabāb (youth). The 
words described enthusiasm and optimism after the collapse of the regimes. They 
also gloriﬁ ed revolutionaries and legitimized the organization among the revolution-
aries. Al-Zawahiri combined the revolutionary meanings with religious slogans like 
sharī’a (sharia law), umma islāmiyya (Muslim Nation) or rāyāt al-islām (banner of 
Islam). The theological words reserved the ideological backgrounds of the organiza-
tion and intended to create positive image. He also presented some arguments about 
hypocrisy of Western countries and local secular forces, which supported the Arab 
dictators for a long time. He proposed an alternative regarding establishment of an 
Islamic state based on sharia values and traditions of Muslim empires.
However, failures and disappointments of the Arab Spring and destabiliza-
tion of the political and social situation as well economic crisis encouraged Al-Za-
wahiri to present a new concept of jihad discussed in the manifesto Khurūj min 
dā’irat al-’abthi wa al-fashli (Exit of the circle of ineﬃ  ciency and failure)9. It con-
tains an innovative vision of the battle and identiﬁ cation of new frontlines in the 
changing Arab and Muslim world. He speciﬁ es Syria, Egypt and Chechnya as the 
main destinations of jihad.
Syria becomes main battleﬁ eld for jihadists who compare it to Afghanistan 
in eighties when foreign volunteers supported local rebels against the Soviet inva-
sion. The Syrian conﬂ ict is also a spectacular and emotional inspiration for volun-
teers ﬁ ghting against the brutality of Al-Assad’s regime. Al-Zawahiri encourages 
all jihadists to ﬁ nish their disputes, unite and ﬁ ght for the same reasons and goals 
regarding the implementation of the caliphate in Syria.
The battle in Syria is confronted with jihad in Chechnya. After the death 
of regional leader Doku Umarov, Al-Qaeda Central emphasized Arab or Middle 
Eastern context of Caucasus front and appointed the new emir Ali Abu Muham-
mad a.k.a. Aliaskhab Kebekov. Kebekov spent all his life abroad and established 
good communication channels with diﬀ erent rebels in the Arab and Islam coun-
tries. Al-Zawahiri concept regards reinforcement of ﬁ nancial and logistic support 
to Caucasus rebels.10 Moreover, jihad in Chechnya enables to conduct political and 
economic pressure on Russia, which supports Al-Assad clan and his allies like Iran 
or Hezbollah in Lebanon. Besides, there are 14 thousands Chechen insurgents in 
8 www.muslm.org/vb/showthreat.php [accessed 20.08.2014].
9 www.archive.org/details/Tampering, see also: www.nokbah.com/~w3/?p=4389 [accessed 
20.08.2014].
10 M. Vatchagaev, “North Caucasus militants announce new leader to replace Umarov”, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, No. 11, Issue 54.
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Syria who integrate the ﬁ ght with hostility against Russian invaders in their own 
country. The group Jaysh al-Muhājirīn wa al-Anṣār (The Army of Immigrants 
and Mohammad’s Supporters) with its Caucasian leaders: Omar Gorgashvili, Abu 
Omar Shishani or Magomed Abdurakhmarov is a good example.
Besides, Egypt is another important point for Al-Zawahiri. Radicalization 
of Islamic movements after the overthrow of Mohammad Mursi, intensiﬁ cation of 
terrorist attacks by the group Anṣār Bayt al-Maqdis (The Followers of Jerusalem) 
or Bedouin’s rebellion in Sinai encouraged Al-Qaida to focus on the new Egyptian 
circumstances. Al-Zawahiri states that moderate Islamic forces have failed because 
of peaceful cooperation with secularists and Western governments. He also hopes 
that all insurgents will return to the real military ﬁ ght against their true enemies.
However, Al-Qaida Central has been aﬀ ected by other political and social 
trends in diﬀ erent parts of the Middle East and Africa. 
Iraq and Syria
Recent activities of Islamist groups in Iraq and Syria result from marginalisation 
of Sunni communities after the US intervention in 2003 and collapse of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime that privileged Shia opposition and humiliated Sunni clans. Dis-
proportion of social and religious representatives in the new government caused 
Sunni uprisings in 2006 and then in 2013 in Ramadi, Falluja or Anbar provinces. 
Besides, regime’s oﬃ  cers and soldiers removed from the apparatus also joined the 
rebellion and shared their organizational and military experiences with the Sunni 
opposition.11 The situation created favorable motivations for jihadist groups like 
Al-Qā’ida fī al-’Irāq (Al-Qaeda in Iraq – AQI), Shūrat al-Mujāhidīn (Mujahideen 
Council) or Ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī al-’Irāq (The Islamic State of Iraq). They 
assimilated among Sunni communities and cooperated with diﬀ erent political and 
tribal forces against domination of Shia government considered as a heretic and 
apostate authority.12
Furthermore, brutality and escalation of the Syrian conﬂ ict as well as fail-
ures of political negotiations and peace talks intensiﬁ ed the Sunni-Shia schism. The 
oﬃ  cial debate and discourse of main political and religious representatives studied 
the question of Al-Assad’s Shia-allawit identity and cooperation of the Syrian re-
gime with other Shia allies such as Iran, Iraq or Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
For instance, the religious schism is evident in sermons of popular Sunni 
preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Their speeches 
delivered in the context of the violent events in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq 
11 J.-P. Perrin, “Les ex du regime de Saddam Hussein, terreau des radicaux”, Liberation, 12 
Juin 2014, www.liberation.fr/monde/2011/08/26 [accessed 20.09.2014].
12 F. Alani, “Irak-Syrie, meme combats”, Le Monde Diplomatique, Janvier 2014, p. 6. See 
also: L. de Saint Perier, “Back to Irak”, Jeune Afrique, 22–28 juin 2014, p. 54–56.
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concern rhetoric devices, which inﬂ uence the audience and encourage potential 
militants to support particular religious block.13
Islamist rebels from Syria refer to the same ideological and theological back-
grounds but they are divided in their radicalism and strategy. For example, Jaysh 
al-Mujāhidīn (The Army of Mujahideen) or Jabhat Ṣuwwār Suryā (The Front of 
Syrian Revolutionaries) ﬁ ght for an Islamic state but they refuse takfīr and coop-
erate with secular opposition, including the Free Syrian Army. However, Jabha 
islāmiyya (Islamic Front) is the biggest moderate group, which includes 45 000 
insurgents gathered in eight battalions.14
Fights among rival factions, ambitions of particular leaders as well as ideo-
logical discussions strengthened the positions of the two main groups Jabhat al-
Nuṣra li-Ahl ash-Shām (The Support Front for the People of Sham-al-Nusra Front) 
aﬃ  liated with Al-Qaeda Central and Ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī al-῾Irāq wa ash-
Shām (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – ISIS) headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghda-
di.15 They share the same ideas regarding establishment of the caliphate based on 
strict sharia law but they discuss the loyalty to Al-Qaida Central and Ayman al-Za-
wahiri or ISIS leader. Al-Zawahiri condemns ISIS for its autonomy and disobe-
dience. He also stresses that al-Nusra Front under leadership of Abu Mohammad 
al-Jawlani is the only representative of jihad in Syria. ISIS should return to its ﬁ rst 
local structures in Iraq and its name: The Islamic State of Iraq. 
The leadership of Al-Zawahiri is ignored by many insurgents. For instance, 
the spokesman of ISIS Abu Mohammad al-Adnani issued the manifesto Mā kāna 
haḏā manhajunā wa lan yakuna (It was not our way and it won’t be)16, which crit-
icizes Al-Qaida Central and deﬁ nes ﬁ nal separation between Al-Zawahiri and the 
rest of ﬁ ghters.
Al-Adnani states that the leader betrayed insurgents, who ﬁ ght every day 
in battleﬁ elds of Iraq or Syria. Furthermore, Al-Zawahiri distorted basic ideas of 
jihad, which gathered diﬀ erent militants in the world. The message also gloriﬁ es 
jihad heroes like Osama bin Laden or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and condemns the 
current leader of cooperation with inﬁ dels and secularists. Al-Adnani also declares 
that Al-Zawahiri resigned from jihad and implementation of sharia law. He tries to 
involve the organization in current political and social processes in the Arab and 
Muslim world by creation of wide Umma based on diﬀ erent religious and social 
trends, including secular forces. ISIS encourages its supporters to continue the ﬁ ght 
and return to the roots of jihad. Domination of ISIS in the region was ﬁ nally de-
13 M. Styszyński, “Środki retoryczne w emocjonalizacji konﬂ iktu syryjskiego”, Forum Artis 
Rhetoricae 2013, No. 3 (34).
14 A. Rodier, Syrie: situation debut 2014, “Centre Francais de Recherche sur le Renseigne-
ment”, 21 December 2013, No. 337, www.cf2r.org/fr/notes-actualite/syrie-situation-debut-2014.
php [accessed 16.07.2014].
15 Abd al-Mun῾im Shitūr, “Dā῾ash yukaﬃ  ru Mursī wa yukhawwinu An-Nuṣra wa yuhājimu 
Aẓ-Ẓawāhirī”, Al-Chorouq, 15 June 2014, p. 12.
16 www.youtube.com/watch?v=I5vweRAVBFk [accessed 16.07.2014].
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termined in the end of June 2014, especially after announcement of the caliphate 
by Al-Baghdadi, who delivered a symbolic sermon in the main mosque in Mosul, 
Iraq.17 Liturgical character of the speech, theological phrases, pathetic words as 
well as suggestive slogans and demands demonstrated the importance and distinc-
tion of the organization in the worldwide jihadist movement.
Economic and ﬁ nancial goals became an important factor for ISIS as well. 
The groups has stolen 429 million USD from the Iraqi central bank and seized Baiji 
oil reﬁ nery in the north of Baghdad as well as strategic dam near Mosul. Insurgents 
also took control of Shaar gas ﬁ eld near Palmyra, one of Syria’s largest hydrocar-
bons reservoirs.18 It should be pointed out that ISIS did not pursuit its oﬀ ensive to 
the Iraqi capital and concentrated on ﬁ nancial proﬁ ts in order to weaken the central 
Shia government and strengthen its own political power in the region.    
Al-Baghdadi’s followers also began massive media campaign. They publish 
an English version of the Dabiq magazine that targets young, Western audience, at-
tracts potential volunteers and encourages them to join the new state in the Middle 
East.19 The journal includes photos illustrating harvest campaign and distribution of 
food and water in controlled regions. Other pictures show brutal executions of Shia 
prisoners, representatives of Christian and Yazidi communities. ISIS also applies 
some euphemistic words and sentences already known in radical Islamist propa-
ganda. For example, diﬀ erent opponents are usually called ṣalībiyyūn (crusaders), 
ṭaghūt (a devil, a Satan) or kuﬀ ār (sinners) and murtaddūn (apostates).20
The Dabiq magazine also contains emotional photos of successful oﬀ ensive 
in Syria and Iraq, victorious parades of militants in controlled cities as well as fail-
ures of oﬃ  cial forces from Baghdad. ISIS also points out its campaign against dif-
ferent Muslim branches, especially Shia and Suﬁ  communities. For example, some 
colorful and sophisticated graphics show destroyed shrines and wounded Iraqi sol-
diers among ﬁ res and explosions. The pictures are followed by symbolic sentences 
such as: Khalifa declared: A new era has arrived or: It’s either the Islamic state of 
the fl ood. ISIS resigns from deep theological argumentations and limits the debate 
to short messages including citation of particular Quranic verses or ideological 
statements of leaders and insurgents.
17 www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXempOO7Fl4. See also: www.iraqinews.com/features/urgent-
video-isis-releases-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-sermon-mosul-grand-mosque/ [accessed 16.07.2014].
18 P. Mahadevan, “Jihadism in Africa: Marching together, striking separately, Counter 
Terrorist Trends and Analysis 2014, Vol. 6, No. 7, p. 4–7. See also: R. Norland, S. Al-Salhy, “Ex-
tremists Attack Iraq’s Biggest Oil Reﬁ nery”, The New York Times, 18 June 2014, www.nytimes.
com/2014/06/19/world/middleeast/iraqi-oil-reﬁ nery-ablaze-as-army-and-militants-clash.html?_r=0 
[accessed 16.07.2014].
19 The PDF version of the magazine: www.ia802500.us.archive.org/24/items/dbq01_desk-
top_en/dbq01_desktop_en.pdf [accessed 16.07.2014].
20 M. Styszyński, “Al-Qaeda’s Structure According to Propaganda Techniques”, Acta Asiati-
ca Varsoviensia 2011, No. 24, p. 125–136.
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Cover and one of the pages from the Dabiq magazine presenting main headlines elaborated in the 
publication, including policy and strategy of the new caliphate.
In fact, ISIS massive campaign decreased al-Nusra operational and ideo-
logical capacities. The indoctrination is usually limited to traditional jihadist web-
sites such as Shabakat al-Jihād al-’Alām (Worldwide Jihad Network) or Shabakat 
Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn (Mujahideen Followers Network).21 However, the websites 
are often blocked or suspended and they do not target wide audience like You-
Tube channels, English publications or Twitter and Facebook proﬁ les coordinated 
by ISIS militants. Besides, al-Nusra Front does not carry out spectacular acts like 
video transmission of Al-Baghdadi’s speeches in mosques, parades in controlled 
provinces and brutal executions of hostages.
al-Nusra’s militants also try to distinguish operations and they emphasis spe-
ciﬁ c strategy of the organization. For example, they started to defend Palestinian 
case instead of Al-Baghdadi who states that ISIS ﬁ ghters must overthrow inﬁ eld 
and corrupted regimes in Arab countries and then destroy Israel. Besides, al-Nusra 
Front has seized recently border crossing in Quneitra province connecting Syria 
with Golan Heights and announced potential attacks against the Hebrew State in 
order to liberate Gaza and Jerusalem.22 Al-Jawlani’s ﬁ ghters also target foreigners, 
who still serve and work in Syria like journalists, NGO’s workers or doctors. In 
2012 they captured the journalist Peter Theo Curtis, who was ﬁ nally released by the 
end of August. al-Nusra is also responsible for the kidnap of 43 UN peacekeepers 
during ﬁ ghts in Quneitra. Contrary to ISIS, al-Nusra does not commit brutal execu-
tions released afterwards in the Internet like it happened with James Foley’s decap-
21 www.shabakataljahad.com, see also: www.as-ansar.com [accessed 04.09.2014].
22 E. Miller, “Syrian al-Qaeda Fighters Flee Southward toward Israel Border”, The Times 
of Israel, 25 July 2014, www.timesoﬁ srael.com/syrian-al-qaeda-ﬁ ghters-ﬂ ee-southward-toward-isra-
el-border/ [accessed 06.09.2014].
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itation. The group often prefers enormous ransoms or liberation of comrades from 
prisons. Such demands were presented after the kidnap of 43 UN peacekeepers.23
Arabian Peninsula
Some new trends are also evident in the Arabian Peninsula, the historic base of mo-
dern jihadism. The region was the core base for the worldwide radicals like Osama 
bin Laden who left Saudi Arabia and Yemen to conduct his ﬁ ght against the Soviet 
invasion in Afghanistan.
The US military aid to local monarchies during the Operation Desert Strom 
in nineties after the Iraqi invasion on Kuwait intensiﬁ ed tensions between Saudis 
and bin Laden who protested against Western military support to the monarchies 
in the Gulf. The new form of jihad was studied by other radicals like Ayman al-Za-
wahiri or Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian teacher and mentor of Osama bin 
Laden during the Afghan war, who supported establishment of worldwide terrorist 
organization and drew its ideological backgrounds concerning ﬁ ght against West-
ern inﬂ uences in the Arab-Muslim world called a new crusade against Islam. Ideo-
logical leaders also opted for restoration of the historic caliphate based on straight 
sharia laws24. The propaganda campaign enabled to precise ideological, structural 
and military capacities of the organization. It was focused on two opposite images. 
The ﬁ rst referred to accusations and damnations of diﬀ erent political enemies like 
Western governments and military forces as well as local authorities and oﬃ  cials. 
The second idea gloriﬁ ed terrorist activities and encouraged supporters and mili-
tants. The opponents were called ṣalībiyyun (crusaders), ´ubbād aṣ-ṣalīb (believers 
of the crust), ṭaghūt (a devil, a Satan), kuﬀ ār (sinners) or murtaddūn (apostates) and 
a´dā’ Allah ta´āla (The enemies of Allah)25.
It should be pointed out that ﬁ rst Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks were attempted 
in the Gulf countries. In 2000 a suicide attack seized the United Stated Navy de-
stroyer USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden. The event inspired other attacks in 
the world, including the September 11 attacks or Madrid train bombings in 2004 
and London attacks in 2005.
However, successful antiterrorist missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan as 
well as arrest of main jihadists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (the mastermind of 
the 9/11 attacks) disabled logistic, ﬁ nancial and executive capacities of Al-Qaeda 
headquarters in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The jihadist movement in Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen was forced to reform and regroup local cells.
23 A. Sterman, “Syrian Rebels Abduct 43 UN Peacekeepers Near Israel Border”, The Times 
of Israel, 28 August 2014, www.timesoﬁ srael.com/syrian-rebels-abduct-43-un-peacekeepers/ [accessed 
06.09.2014].
24 L. Wright, Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York 2006.
25 M. Styszyński, “Al-Qaeda’s Structure According to Propaganda Techniques”..., p. 125–136.
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In 2009 jihadists formed Al-Qā’ida fī Jazīrat al-’Arab (Al-Qaeda in the Ara-
bian Peninsula – AQAP) under the leadership of Naser al-Wuhayshi and Anwar 
al-Awlaqi. Al-Wuhayshi served as a private secretary to Osama bin Laden in Af-
ghanistan. He was arrested in 2001 and handed over to Yemen where he escaped 
from prison in 2006 with 23 of his followers. Besides, Al-Awlaqi, a US born radical 
cleric played a key role in ideological and theological formation in the organiza-
tion. He issued an illustrated magazine Inspire, which became an important com-
munication and motivation platform for extremists around the world26. 
The cover of the Inspire magazine describing the terrorist plot from 2010 when two packages con-
taining bombs were found on cargo planes from Yemen to Chicago27. 
Sophisticated and modern style of the magazine contained short messages 
in English based on suggestive graphics and signiﬁ cant pictures similar to tabloid 
press or comics and graﬃ  ti. The slogans exposed in the journals usually refer to 
martyrdom and bravery of militants as well as destructive activities of Western 
countries.
Apart from the cargo plots in 2010,28 the following examples demonstrate 
some results of Al-Awlaqi’s inspirations and AQAP coordination of particular ac-
tions. In 2009 Carlos Leon Bledsoe, a Muslim convert who had spent time in Ye-
men opened ﬁ re on soldiers in front of a military recruiting oﬃ  ce in Little Rock in 
Arkansas. On Christmas Day in 2009 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab a young Nige-
rian student from Institute for the Arabic language in San’a tried to detonate plastic 
explosives on board of the plane en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. Al-Awlaqi 
was also implicated in the 2009 US army base killings in Fort Hood in Texas. Nidal 
26 K. Boon, A.Z. Huq et al., Global Stability and U.S. National Security, New York 2012 (Vol. 123).
27 www.azelin.ﬁ les.wordpress.com/2010/11/inspire-magazine-3.pdf [accessed 16.07.2014].
28 K. de Young, M. Leahy, “Uninvestigated Terrorism Warning about Detroit Suspect Called not Un-
usual”, The Washington Post, 28 December 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2009/12/27/AR2009122700279.html [accessed 16.07.2014].
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Malik Hasan a US Army Major and psychiatrist opened ﬁ re and killed 13 people 
and wounded 32 others.29 All suspects responsible for the plots confessed that they 
were motivated by Al-Awlaqi’s ideology and slogans published in the Internet and 
Inspire magazine. Finally, Al-Awlaqi has been killed in 2011 by drone attack on his 
convoy in Jawf province, Yemen.30 His death coincided with a successful strike in 
2011 against Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Pakistan where Navy Seals attacked the 
residence in Abbottabad near Islamabad and killed Al-Qaeda’s leader.  
***
After Al-Awlaqi and Bin Laden’s death AQAP’s religious ﬁ gures established an 
operational branch called Anṣār ash-Sharī῾a (The Followers of Sharia) to formal-
ize new challenges of the organization. Naser al-Wuhayshi resigned from global 
and international goals, returned to Sunni tribal roots and limited the activities to 
local territories31. In fact, southern Yemeni provinces of Abyan inhabited by tradi-
tional Sunni communities were always an important bastion for Islamists. Local 
separatism, Yemeni civil war between south and north of the country in eighties 
and nineties as well as marginalisation of southern regions by president Ali Ab-
dullah Saleh increased jihadist inﬂ uences.32 It should be pointed out that diﬀ erent 
tribes are rather opportunistic and they usually compete with other clans in order to 
gain more economic and social privileges and proﬁ ts. 
Moreover, AQAP took advantages of widespread corruption and growing 
poverty as well as instability during the Arab Spring and the Battle of Zinjibar in 
2011 between president Saleh’s forces and opposition, including Islamist move-
ments. Jihadists seized southern regions and announced establishment of the Islam-
ic Emirate of Abyan.33
After the appointment of the new president Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi, new 
authorities started reconciliation policy and cooperation with tribes.34 For exam-
ple, one of the largest tribe Al-Awlaqi declared its support to the government and 
opposed to Al-Qaeda members. It should be pointed out that Anwar al-Awlaqi be-
29 B. Kenber, “Nidal Hasan Convicted of Fort Hood Killings”, The Washington Post, 23 Au-
gust 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nidal-hasan-convicted-of-fort-hood-
killings/2013/08/23/39c468c8-0c03-11e3-9941-6711ed662e71_story.html [accessed 16.07.2014].
30 H. Koplowitz, “US Formally Admits Killing Anwar Al-Awlaki, 3 Other Citizens, In Drone 
Strikes”, International Business Times, 22 May 2013, www.ibtimes.com/us-formally-admits-kill-
ing-anwar-al-awlaki-3-other-citizens-drone-strikes-full-text-1275805 [accessed 29.06.2014].
31 A.Y. Zelin, “Know Your Ansar al-Sharia”, Foreign Policy, 21 September 2012.
32 B.A. Salmoni, B. Loidolt et al., Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: the Huthi 
Phenomenon, “National Defense Research Institute-RAND” 2010.
33 C.L. Coombs, “Yemen’s Use of Militias to Maintain Stability in Abyan Province”, Combat-
ing Terrorism Center at West Point-CTC 2013, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 5–7.
34 Ibidem.
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longed to that clan and received technical and logistic aid from tribal relatives. 
Unfortunately, the pact between jihadists and members of Al-Jawf, Marib, Abyan 
or Shabwa and Hadramout tribes is still strong and it facilitates operational and 
military capacities of AQAP.
The organization carries out diﬀ erent attacks against central authorities in 
San’a. In May 2012 an explosion killed 120 people and injured 200 others during 
a parade. In December 2013 a series of bomb and gun attacks on Ministry of De-
fense buildings killed at least 56 persons. AQAP kidnaps or executes Yemeni of-
ﬁ cials and plants many land mines. Militants also lay various ambushes against 
military and security convoys and patrols.35
Furthermore, AQAP increases tensions with Shia communities known as 
Huthis who live in northern Sa’da regions and belong to Zaydi branch of Islam. It 
was evident during clashes between Huthis and radical Sunni militants in Dammaj 
province controlled by Shia Zaydi followers.36 
Besides, AQAP members have started recently the debate about ISIS oﬀ en-
sive and declaration of the caliphate. Apart from diﬀ erent opinions, Naser al-Wu-
hayshi has already pledged oath of allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri. He stressed 
that insurgents will continue their ﬁ ghts under Al-Zawahiri’s administration and 
will follow his orders due to his theological skills and military experiences as well 
as long cooperation with Osama bin Laden and Yemeni structures of Al-Qaeda.37
North Africa and Sahel
Some new tendencies are also evident in Maghreb and Sahel. Declaration of loyal-
ty to Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaida’s Central in 2006 by Abdelmalek Droukdel 
a.k.a. Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud as well as creation of Tanẓīm al-qā’ida fī bilād 
al-maghrib al-islāmī (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb – AQIM) became an im-
portant step for jihadist structures in Maghreb. In fact, the support strengthened 
military and operational capacities of local Al-Qaida’s structures. After the aﬃ  l-
iation with the central command, AQIM prepared series of terrorist acts against 
local and Western authorities as well as their economic interests. For example, the 
group claimed responsibility for the 11 December 2007 attacks against the United 
Nations oﬃ  ces and the Constitutional Court building in Algiers.38
35 A.Y. Zelin, op. cit.
36 R. Al-Jubari, “Hadi Assigns Military Committee to End Fighting in Dammaj”, Yemen 
Times, 2 January 2014.
37 B. Roggio, “AQAP Leader Pledges Oath of Allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri”, The Long 
War Journal, 26 July 2011, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/07/aqap_leader_pledges.php#ixz-
z39u3GeMW4 [accessed 29.06.2014].
38 M. Baghdād, Dimā’ aṣ-ṣaḥrā’, Al-Jazā’ir 2012, p. 81–107.
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However, terrorist activities in Algeria became more and more complicated 
because of successful antiterrorist operations and strong reactions of the society 
rejecting radical ideas as well as reconciliation policy implemented by Algerian 
authorities in 2005. Besides, the support of local theologians and imams from 
mosques played an important role as well. They delivered diﬀ erent sermons con-
demning extremism and violence in Islam.39
Al-Qaida’s ﬁ ghters were forced to search a new shelter. In 2003 the three 
main brigades: Ṭāriq Abū Zayd, Al-Furqān (The Criterion) and Al-Anṣār (Proph-
et’s followers) found a new battleﬁ eld in southern regions of Sahara poorly con-
trolled by authorities and security services. Al-Qaida’s ﬁ nancial, logistic and mil-
itary capacities were supported by aﬃ  liation with local gangs and gunrunners or 
smugglers of goods and drugs. Good relationships with local communities, includ-
ing Tuaregs as well as ransoms for kidnapped Western tourists in Sahara played an 
important role as well.40
During the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali in 2012 Islamist ﬁ ghters from 
Anṣār ad-Dīn (The Followers of the Faith) or Ḥarakat at-Tawḥīd wa al-Jihād fī 
Gharb al-Ifrīqyā (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa – MUJWA) joined 
the uprising and seized Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal regions in the north of the country.41
 The expansion of jihadist activities encouraged Western and African forces 
to start the Serval operation in northern Mali in 2013. The antiterrorist campaign 
destroyed rebel bases and decentralized Al-Qaida’s structures in the region. The 
everyday ﬁ ghts, smuggling and ransom business were conducted by second rang 
players from Mauritania who belonged to young generation of jihadists from rad-
ical Mauritanian theological schools.42 Although their ideological backgrounds, 
they could not achieve ﬁ ghting spirit and brutality of their predecessors.
Droukdel tried to consolidate his followers and insurgents by delivering dif-
ferent manifestos and statements. A couple of weeks before the intervention in Mali 
he referred to diﬀ erent problems and social questions in the region. He focused on 
examples illustrating devastating economic policy of Western countries not only 
in Maghreb and Sahel, but also in Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Senegal or Cam-
eroon. In his opinion, the real sense of Western presence in the continent regards 
exploitation of natural resources such as gas, oil or uranium. The negative image 
was intensiﬁ ed by description of poor African children collecting cacao grains for 
multinational companies producing chocolate. Droukdel stressed that Western con-
cerns for people in the region are just a political game, which covers authentic 
39 African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism [ed. F.J. Madeira], 2012, 
Vol. 3, No. 1.
40 M. Mokeddem, Al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique, contrabande au nom de l’islam, Alger 
2010, p. 69–137 ; M. Ag Erless, D. Kone, Le Patriote et le djihadiste, Bamako 2012.
41 Doumbi-Fakoly, H. Magassa et al.., L’Occupation du nord du Mali, Bamako 2012.
42 R. Ould Idoumou, “Al Qaida Appoints New Mali Chief”, Magharebia, 28 November 2012, www.
magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2013/09/25/feature-02 [accessed 29.06.2014].
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purposes of economic and social domination. He also states that Western ignorance 
of massacres in Syria is a good example in that context.43
***
Although Droukdel’s ideological indoctrination many jihadists started to operate 
individually in diﬀ erent parts of Maghreb and Sahel. They emphasize their local 
and autonomic character and focus on social, ethnic and geographic character of 
the region. For example, the battalion Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣaddīq derived from Anṣār 
al-Sharī῾a in Tunisia, Ḥumāt ad-da῾wa as-salafi yya (Defenders of Salaﬁ  Call) con-
trols western Algeria and ῾ Uqba Ibn Nāfi ῾ concentrates on Chaambi fortiﬁ ed moun-
tains between Algeria and Tunisia.44
The decentralization or nationalization of jihad is also obvious in the con-
text of Ḥarakat Shabāb al-Janūb li-῾Adala Islāmiyya (The Movement of South-
ern Youth for Islamic Justice) led by Lamine Ben Cheneb who has been killed 
during the antiterrorist operation in In Amenas.45 It should be pointed out that Ben 
Cheneb’s organization played a crucial role in the attacks thanks to its logistic and 
military support. The group operates in Ilizi region since 2005 and it was involved 
in many plots against Algerian authorities, including the terrorist attack at Djanet 
airport in 2007. The Movement of Southern Youth declared its separatist ideas and 
emphasized local identity combined with radical Islamic slogans.46
Although neutralization of key ﬁ gures of the organization, Ben Cheneb’s 
family continues the battle and cooperates with local Tuareg movements. In Janu-
ary 2014 some jihadist forums and websites posted a manifesto of the new group 
Ḥarakat al-Aḥrār (The Movement of Liberated People) headed by Abd al-Salam 
Tarmun one of the Ben Cheneb relatives and Bukhami Bay al-Souqi the represen-
tative of local Sahara clan. Al-Souqi was imprisoned in 2005 and charged with 
terror plots in Tamarasset and rebel activities against Algerian authorities. He was 
released in 2007 and disappeared among insurgents in Sahara. Ḥarakat al-Aḥrār 
underlines some separatist demands and presents tragic social situation of local 
43 The English version of the manifesto see: SITE Intelligence Group – Monitoring Service 
– Jihadist threats, www.siteintelgroup.com [accessed 15.06.2013].
44 Abd ar-Razzāq Abd Allāh, “Tanẓīm al-qā’ida fī bilād al-maghrib al-islāmī yu’linu inẓmām 
jamā’at ḥumāt ad-da῾wa as-salaﬁ yya ilà ṣufūﬁ hi”, Al-Quds al-’Arabī, 29 December 2013, www.
alquds.co.uk/?p=118037 [accessed 15.07.2014].
45 During the attack against in Amenas gas plant in 2013 the terrorist commando Al-Mu-
waqi'ūn bi-ad-Dam (Those who Sign with Blood Brigade) took over 800 people from the gas site. 
After the raid of Algerian Special Forces most of the workers, including 107 foreigners were freed. 
However, 39 foreign hostages were killed, see: I. Ghioua, “Les emirs se font la guerre au Sahel”, 
L’Expression, 15 May 2014, p. 3.
46 D. Gardham, “Terrorist Group Behind Algerian Gas Plan Attack Filmed Training in the 
Desert”, The Telegraph, 23 January 2013.
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communities suﬀ ering from thirst and hunger as well as disastrous living condi-
tions. Besides, radical religious slogans are not emphasized too much and they 
become a background for other social aspects.47
The current jihad activity also relies on Mukhtar Belmukhtar.48 He split with 
Droukdel who appointed Abu Zeid and Abu al-Hammam49 the emirs of Sahara 
and ignored Belmukhtar’s ambitions. Mukhtar tired to exclude the leader of AQIM 
and associate his militants with Al-Qaida Central and Ayman al-Zawahiri. He ex-
pressed his concept in the manifesto delivered during the In Amenas attack. He 
demanded the release of radical sheikh Abd ar-Rahman who was engaged in The 
World Trade Center bombing occurred in 199350 or liberation of Aaﬁ a Siddiqui, 
a nuclear scientist from Pakistan, who was accused of cooperation with Al-Qae-
da51. The arguments demonstrated solidarity and loyalty of Maghreb structure of 
Al-Qaeda with ideas and goals of other groups in the Middle East, Africa or Asia.
In fact, the In Amenas crisis strengthened the role of Belmukhtar in the local 
jihadist movement, but it also polarized the conﬂ ict with Droukdel. Besides, Al-Za-
wahiri did not reply to Belmukhtar’s appeals and sustained Droukdel’s position.
The situation forced Belmukhtar to ﬁ nd a new secure shelter in Libya where 
he habituated to political and social unrest after the collapse of Muammar Gadda-
ﬁ  regime. He separated deﬁ nitely with AQIM leaders and started his cooperation 
with rebels from Anṣār ad-Dīn and MUJWA who survived the operation Serval. 
Moreover, he created a new group Murabiṭūn aﬃ  liated with tribal militias in Libya. 
47 B. Kibāsh, “Muḥammad as-Sādis yaqūdu tanẓīman jadīdan fī aṣ-ṣaḥrā’”, An-Nahār, 9 January 
2014, p. 7.
48 Mukhtar Belmukhtar – a veteran ﬁ ghter from Algerian civil war in eighties. He participated 
in the Afghan war in eighties and the Algerian conﬂ ict in nineties. He was the key ﬁ gure in the Armed 
Islamist Group – GIA. He moved in 2004 to border regions between Algeria, Niger, Libya and Mali. 
He headed his own group Al-Mulathamūn (The Masked), which cooperated with local gangs and 
tribal militias. He also established the terrorist commando Al-Muwaqi'ūn bi-ad-Dam (Those who 
Sign with Blood Brigade), which coordinated In Amenas attack. See: X. Raufer, Atlas radykalnego 
islamu, Warszawa 2011.
49 Abd al-Hamid Abu Zeid headed the group Ṭāriq Abū Zayd, which was acting across Sahel 
regions between Mauritania, Mali and Niger. It was famous for kidnappings and brutal executions of 
hostages (for example, the execution of French hostage Michel Germanau or British hostage Edwin 
Dyer). Abu Zeid was killed during the operation Serval in 2013. Besides, Yahya Abu al-Hammam 
was the leader of the group Al-Furqān (The Criterion). The group was responsible for diﬀ erent attacks 
against Mauritanian authorities and kidnappings of foreign tourists in Sahara. See: P. Siegel, What 
does the Nomination of Yahya Abu al-Hamman Mean?, “Terrorism research and analysis consor-
tium TRAC”, www.trackingterrorism.org/article/djamel-okacha-aka-yahya-abu-al-hamman-succes-
sor-abu-zeid [accessed 29.06.2014].
50 J. Mckinkley, “Islamic Leader on U.S. Terrorist List is in Brooklyn”, The New York Times, 
16 December 1990, www.nytimes.com/1990/12/16/nyregion/islamic-leader-on-us-terrorist-list-is-in-
brooklyn.html [accessed 28.06.2013].
51 D. Walsh, “The Mystery of Dr Aaﬁ a Siddiqui”, The Guardian, 24 November 2009, www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/24/aaﬁ a-siddiqui-al-qaida [accessed 28.06.2013].
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In fact, Murabiṭūn became a small part of wide rebellion in Libya inspired 
by separatist, nationalist, tribal or ethnic ideas.
Western regions of Libya are dominated by secular and separatist militias 
as well as military and security forces. It concerns Katā’ib aṣ-Ṣā῾iqa (Al-Saiqa 
Brigade), which is a special military formation of three thousand persons sepa-
rated from Gaddaﬁ ’s regime during the uprising in 2011. The group is ﬁ ghting 
with jihadist insurgents and it is supposed to create new formations in the Libyan 
army. Aṣ-Ṣā῾iqa also supports the current oﬀ ensive of the general Khalid Haftar 
against jihadist militias.52 The organization Ṣuwwār Lībyā (Revolutionaries of Lib-
ya) regards a strong alliance of insurgents who participated in the uprising against 
Muammar Gaddaﬁ  regime. They are very inﬂ uential in Tripoli. Furthermore, tribal 
mountainous region in the south-west of the country is seized by Katā’ib Zintān 
(Zintan Brigades), which participated in liberation of Tripoli and arrested Gadd-
aﬁ ’s son Sayf al-Islam. They also control the international airport in the capital 
and support the oﬀ ensive of general Haftar. The most powerful organization in 
the west concerns Katā’ib Misrāta (Misrata Brigades), which played an essential 
role during Gaddaﬁ  military oﬀ ensive against revolutionaries. It also supports local 
politicians from Misrata.53
Furthermore, separatists control some eastern regions. It regards Barqa Bri-
gades composed of separatist insurgents from Barqa, Tubruk or Sirt ﬁ ghting for 
federalization of the country. The organization controls 60% of oil reservoirs as 
well as main ports exporting oil supplies to the West. Similarly to ISIS, Libyan 
rebels took control of the largest oil terminals in Hariga or Zueitina in Cyrenaica. 
The central government in Tripoli started some negotiations with local militias in 
order to return the ports.54 However, Ibrahim Al-Jedran, a former commander in the 
Petroleum Facilities Guard, took control of four of Libya’s oil ports in July 2014. 
Eastern regions also include diﬀ erent Islamist militias such as Anṣār ash-Sharī῾a 
a radical group operating in the region of Darna or Taḥkīm ad-Dīn (The rule of reli-
gion) a new jihadist organization from Benghazi, which is responsible for diﬀ erent 
terrorist attacks, especially against Al-Saiqa Brigade.55
52 General Khalifa Haftar served in the Libyan army and participated in the coup d'état led by 
Gaddaﬁ  in 1969. He split with the regime after the military conﬂ ict between Libya and Chad in eight-
ies. General Haftar escaped with his soldiers to the US via Nigeria and Zaire. He appeared in 2011 
during the Libyan uprising and then in 2014 during the military operation against rebel camps. See: 
A. Bensaada, “Haftar: le pion americain?”, Afrique-Asie, Juillet-Aout 2014, p. 26–27.
53 F. Finucci, Libya: Military Actors and Militias, “Global Security Organization”, www.glo-
balsecurity.org [accessed 10.07.2014].
54 M. Chmaytelli, “Libya Crude Oil Sales to Rise as Rebels Surrender Two Ports”, Bloomberg 
Business Week, 7 July 2014, www.businessweek.com/news/2014-04-07/libya-oil-sales-set-to-rise-
as-rebels-agree-to-surrender-ports [accessed 10.07.2014].
55 M. Dāli῾, “Al-Kharīṭa al-῾askariyya li-katā’ib al-musallaḥa fī Lībyā”, Al-Khabar, 20 May 
2014, p. 18.
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Some Libyan groups are more moderate and they cooperate with secular 
forces. For example, Rif Allāh Saḥātī is headed by Ismail al-Sallabi the brother 
of the inﬂ uential theologian Ali al-Sallabi from the International Union of Mus-
lim Scholars from Qatar. The Brigade is also aﬃ  liated with the worldwide struc-
tures of the Muslim Brotherhood. Besides, Shuhadā’ 17 Fabrāyal (Martyrdoms of 
17th February) supports the Muslim Brotherhood structures in Libya. The group is 
a member of the Libyan army but it reserves its independence and separatism. For 
example, they refuse to follow orders from the central military command in Tripoli 
and they occupy their sieges in Benghazi.56 Tribal and ethnic context is also evi-
dent in southern regions of Fezzan, which include inﬂ uential tribes like Tabu from 
Chad condemning central government in Tripoli for humiliation and discrimina-
tion. Tabu representatives continue violent, clannish ﬁ ghts with Tuaregs living in 
Ghat near the Algerian borders.57
The jihadist movements in Maghreb and Sahel are also aﬀ ected by ISIS 
inﬂ uences. The developing situation in the region encouraged rebels to arrange 
a meeting in Libya with main leaders, including groups from Egypt, Sudan and 
West Africa. The debate concerned the new strategy of the organization in the con-
text of the successful oﬀ ensive conducted by Al-Baghdadi. The participants also 
discussed the support to Al-Zawahiri’s leadership or disobedience and declaration 
of loyalty to the ISIS caliphate. The new concept of Islamic state proposed by 
Al-Baghdadi also inspired local insurgents to present some new ideological plans 
and goals. First scenario includes creation of a big caliphate under the leadership of 
Droukdel and cooperation with groups from Mali, Tunisia and Algeria. The second 
idea regards consolidation of allied forces from Libya and Egypt under supervision 
of Al-Baghdadi. The third scenario concerns creation of a smaller caliphate based 
on Libyan territories controlled by jihadist militias.58
AQIM’s leader still sustains allegiance to Al-Zawahiri and gloriﬁ es his posi-
tion in the jihadist movement and long experiences in ﬁ ght against Western and lo-
cal enemies. He also criticizes establishment of the caliphate without consultation 
with other branches in the world.59 However, scattered groups, including AQIM’s 
members opposed to the opinions and declared positive statements about Al-Bagh-
dadi’s caliphate. Tunisian branch of Anṣār ash-Sharī῾a and ῾Uqba Ibn Nāfi ῾ have 
recently expressed their obedience to ISIS structures. Anṣār ash-Sharī῾a’s spokes-
men delivered a passionate speech in Kairouan mosque glorifying Al-Baghdadi’s 
successful oﬀ ensive. He also called to liberate jailed members of the organization 
56 Ibidem.
57 A. Obeidi, Political Culture in Libya, London 2013. 
58 M. Ibn Aḥmad, “Taqārīr amniyya taḥḏiru min naqli at-tanẓīm ilà Libyā”, Al-Khabar, 7 July 
2014, p. 3.
59 W. Ramzi, “ISIS Caliphate Splits AQIM”, Magharebia, 18 July 2014, www.magharebia.
com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2014/07/18/feature-01 [accessed 20.17.2014].
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in Tunisia.60 Al-Baghdadi’s activities also revived Iyad Agh Ghali, the leader of 
Anṣār ad-Dīn in northern Mali. He claimed that aﬃ  liation with ISIS would create 
new challenges for jihadist groups in the region and it would strengthen operational 
capacities of insurgents.61
The debate about the new strategy has some implications in everyday terror-
ist activities in the region. For example, Libyan militias from Zintan and rival in-
surgents from Misrata as well as some Islamist groups started heavy ﬁ ghts for stra-
tegic international airport in Tripoli. Since July’s battles there are many causalities 
and damages at the airport and neighboring civilian districts. Besides, international 
airlines have cancelled their ﬂ ights to the Libyan capital and foreign embassies 
closed or suspended their missions.62
Moreover, in May 2014 AQIM delivered the manifesto pointing out its in-
volvement in the terrorist attack against Tunisian Interior Minister Lotﬁ  Ben Jed-
dou that left four security guards dead. It was the ﬁ rst assault of AQIM in Tunisia 
that shows expansion of cooperation with Tunisian groups. Besides, in July 2014 
fourteen Tunisian soldiers were killed and twenty wounded in two terrorist attacks 
in the area of Jebel Chaambi.63 The Ministry of Defense stated that it was the blood-
iest attack against army since independence in 1956. Algerian and Tunisian author-
ities have deployed 20,000 soldiers to secure the borders against contraband and 
penetration of the region by terrorists.64
Reactivation of terrorist threat is also evident in west Algeria. On the 14th of 
July 2014 a roadside bomb killed 3 soldiers and 4 civil guards during a patrol in 
Sidi Bel Abbas province.65 It should be remarked that western provinces are more 
secure than southern areas or central Kabylie where jihadist groups are still active 
and dangerous. Military bases and many checkpoints in the west of the country as 
well as peaceful attitude of local communities made terrorist activity very diﬃ  cult. 
Ḥumāt ad-da῾wa as-salafi yya is the only active group in the region. The military 
and operational capacities of the organization are rather weak and the rebels sus-
pended terrorist actions a couple of years ago. However, jihadists proved that they 
are still strong and ready to prepare actions in diﬀ erent regions although security 
measures.
60 J. Arfaoui, “Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia Spokesman Backs ISIS”, Magharebia, 7 July 2014, 
www.magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2014/07/08/feature-01 [accessed 20.17.2014].
61 M. Sharāq, “Za῾īm Anṣār ad-Dīn Iyyād Agh Ghālī yaḏḥaru li-awwal marra fī sharīṭ muṣaw-
war”, Al-Khabar, 7 August 2014, p. 3.
62 J. Tilouine, Y. Ait Akdim, “Les 7 erreurs”, Jeune Afrique, 3–9 août 2014, p. 10–13.
63 S. Tajine, “Tunisia Suﬀ ers Bloodiest Day in 50 Years as Terror Strikes Border”, Al-Monitor, 
21 July 2014, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/07/tunisia-anti-terrorist-law-attack.html# [ac-
cessed 20.17.2014].
64 W. Ramzi, “Algeria Locks Down Border”, Magharebia, 11 September 2013, magharebia.
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Besides, Mukhtar Belmukhtar claimed his responsibility for the suicide at-
tack in northern Mali on the 14th of July that killed one French soldier.66 The assault 
during the French National Day was a symbolic message for Western and local 
authorities showing that the jihadist movement is able to conduct terrorist actions 
although oﬃ  cial statements emphasizing the success of the Serval operation. 
Finally, Islamist ﬁ ghters from the new group Jund al-Khilāfa (Soldiers of the 
Caliphate) captured a French citizen Hervé Gourdel in north-east area of Kabylie. 
The group posted a video with brutal execution of the hostage similar to the last 
decapitations of hostages in Iraq and Syria. The manifesto was also a symbolic 
declaration of allegiance to Al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State.67 
West Africa
The jihad activity in the West Africa refers to growing role of the extremist and 
sectarian organization Boko Haram. It combines traditional jihadist rhetoric with 
clannish and African ethnic autonomy. In fact, the organization focused on trib-
al and social disproportions in Nigeria, especially during the revolts in 2009 in 
northern provinces of Bauchi, Borno and Yobe. Muslim communities from Hausa 
and Fulani tribes protested against tragic social and economic situation as well as 
discriminating policy of southern Christian authorities from Igbo, Yaruba or Ibibio 
clans taking advantages from oil reserves and industrial growth. The uprising was 
headed by Mohammed Yusuf a charismatic religious leader who started preaching 
and religious education of radical Islam in the moderate Nigerian society belonging 
to Sunni Maliki school of jurisprudence or Suﬁ  doctrines. Yusuf also built Quranic 
schools, cultural centers and charity associations, which enabled to recruit new fol-
lowers and form their extremist ideas according to the deﬁ nition of the term Boko 
Haram, which means in Hausa language: “Western education is a sin”. The reli-
gious indoctrination was reinforced by economic policy based on alimentary and 
water deliveries, transportation facilities or manufacturing production controlled 
by Islamists. Mohammed Yusuf was ﬁ nally executed by security services during 
paciﬁ cation of clashes and demonstrations in 2009.68
Abubakar Shekau from Kanuri tribe in the north-east Nigeria became a suc-
cessor. He took advantages of the situation and combined social and economic 
disproportions with extremist religious ideas rejecting Western cultural inﬂ uences 
66 www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/Mort-d-un-soldat-francais-au-Mali-Le-retour-de-
Mokhtar-Belmokhtar-576046 [accessed 20.17.2014].
67 G. Mezzoﬁ ore, “Algeria: Isis-Linked Jund Al-Khilafah Beheads French Hostage Herve 
Gourdel”, International Business Times, 24 September 2014, www.ibtimes.co.uk/algeria-isis-linked-
jund-al-khilafah-beheads-french-hostage-herve-gourdel-1467043 [accessed 20.11.2014].
68 M. Tobota, Od dżihadu Maitatsine do starć Boko Haram – eskalacja islamizmu w pół-
nocnej Nigerii, [w:] Zachód a świat islamu. Zrozumieć innego, ed. I. Kończak, M. Woźniak, Łódź 
2012, p. 75–84.
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and proposing a pure Islamic state based on literary interpretation of sharia laws.
Shekau refers to Yusuf’s ideas regarding establishment of an Islamic state in 
the northern Nigeria.69 The group tries to turn northeastern state of Borno against 
other provinces inhabited by Christian or animalist communities. Boko Haram of-
ten refers to the Baga massacre from April 2013 when hundreds of civilians were 
killed or wounded by Nigerian military forces.70 The organization highlights tragic 
pictures demonstrating burned villages, massacred bodies and destroyed mosques. 
Persecutions against Muslims in Nigeria justify violent acts of the organization 
and create a positive image indicating self-defense policy against humiliation con-
ducted by Nigerian secular authorities supported by Western countries like USA or 
France.
Shekau also brutalized activities of the organization and intensiﬁ ed terror-
ist attacks such as suicide bombings, kidnappings and massacres of whole villag-
es. The organization also increased various assaults against churches and public 
services as well as government representatives. The brutality of the groups was 
ﬁ nally determined in April 2014 when around 230 schoolgirls were kidnapped in 
Chibok.71
Boko Haram also cooperates with the new aﬃ  liated group Jamā῾at al-Anṣār 
al-Muslimīn fī Bilād as-Sudān (Movement of Muslims’ Vanguards in the Black 
Continent-Ansaru), which lunches brutal actions against foreigners living in Ni-
geria and neighboring countries. The militia became famous for kidnapping of 
the French Moulin-Fournier family in the north of Cameroon in February 2013.72 
Jihadist websites posted a video showing masked terrorist commando claiming 
responsibility of the attack and declaring further actions against foreign citizens. 
Ansaru justiﬁ ed its tactic and stated that militants have been defending humiliated 
Muslim communities in African countries. The Moulin-Fournier family was ﬁ nally 
released by security forces but the event arose concerns about instability and in-
crease of terrorist threats in West Africa.
Speciﬁ c and violent character of Boko Haram is evident in propaganda cam-
paign. The organization usually emphasizes images showing violent gestures and 
brutal behaviors of insurgents similar to groups operating in the past in Uganda, 
Rwanda, and Congo or recently in Central Africa.73 The manifestos usually start 
69 M. Harjani, “Nigeria’s Fight against Boko Haram”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis 
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with religious invocations and Quranic citations in Arabic, which glorify the orga-
nization among other rebels and justify terrorist attacks. However, other fragments 
include casual speeches in local dialects as well as English sentences condemning 
Western inﬂ uences in the region. The declarations are also delivered in ironic and 
chaotic style, sometimes making fun of the West and local authorities. For example, 
Abubakar Shekau refers to the kidnapping of Nigerian schoolgirls and he states with 
laughing voice that he will sell them in local market. It should be pointed out that 
during Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri leadership, manifestos respected 
Arabic classic rhetoric and religious narration of the speech. They also avoided dia-
lectal speeches or vulgar declarations and gestures.
Boko Haram also tries to expand its activities in the context of ISIS success-
ful campaign in Iraq and Syria. In July 2014 Shekau voiced his support for Al-Bagh-
dadi and emphasized positive and glorifying expressions about the new caliphate. 
He also claimed his responsibility for attacks against shopping centers in Abuja and 
some bomb detonations in Lagos ports. Shekau also encourages his militants to 
continue other attacks in Nigeria and neighboring countries74. For example, in July 
2014, Boko Haram militants attacked the house of Cameroon’s vice-prime minister 
and they kidnapped his wife. At least three people were killed in the ambush. Be-
sides, a local mayor was kidnapped in a separate attack on his home.75 It was the ﬁ rst 
spectacular plot against authorities of the neighboring country. Shekau’s insurgents 
demonstrate in that way military and political potential of the organization, which 
can attack diﬀ erent targets and places in the region.    
Somalia
The organization Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn (Youth of Mujahideen) determines terrorist 
threats in the Horn of Africa. Ideological and operational basis of the organization 
regards the Union of Islamic Courts – UIC that emerged in Mogadishu in 1994 after 
a long period of ﬁ ghts between rival political and tribal factions. Islamists took ad-
vantages of the tragic social situation in the country and separatist tendencies, which 
contributed to establishment of autonomous regions such as Somaliland formed by 
Somali National Movement or Puntland that implemented its own administration 
and ﬁ nancial system.
Successful terrorist and preaching campaign enabled UIC militants to con-
trol strategic regions in Somalia and facilitated implementation of sharia laws 
among communities tired of long political unrest, health problems and disastrous 
living conditions. The new Islamist authorities established a militia called Shabāb 
al-Mujāhidīn, which followed UIC orders and fought with secular forces such as 
Transition Federal Government.
74 F. Fax, “Boko Haram: Abubakar Shekau, Voices Support for Other Extremist Terrorist 
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Ethiopia, Kenya or Djibouti were concerned about the escalation of radical 
Islam in the neighboring country and prepared military intervention led by Ethiopi-
an forces in 2006. Although neutralization of UIC inﬂ uences, Al-Shabāb structures 
and operational capacities survived and enabled to conduct jihad against foreign 
peacekeepers from Uganda, Burundi and Kenya deployed in 2007 under the United 
Nations and the African Union mandate as well as the African Union Mission to 
Somalia – AMISOM. In 2008 Al-Shabāb aﬃ  liated with Al-Qaeda Central. Osama 
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri gloriﬁ ed ﬁ ghters and pointed out its role in the 
Horn of Africa. Ideological and ﬁ nancial support of Al-Qaeda encouraged Somali 
insurgents to carry out a terrorist campaign in the region. They executed 548 sui-
cide attacks and 90 kidnaps between 2007 and 2012.76
Furthermore, neutralization of many Al-Shabāb bases forced the groups to 
internationalize the terrorist campaign. Some actions targeted Western interests and 
neighboring countries participating in AMISOM. The twin bomb attacks in 2010 
that killed at least 74 people in Kampala determined the ﬁ rst act of terror outside 
Somalia. The explosions hit a popular restaurant frequented by foreigners, who 
were watching the World Cup ﬁ nals. Al-Shabāb militias were involved in 100 at-
tacks in Kenya between 2008 and 2012, including assaults against foreigners. For 
instance, they kidnapped a British couple in Kenya and two Spanish aid workers in 
Daadab refugee camp. In fact, the Nairobi’s Westgate mall attack in 2013 became 
the most tragic terrorist plot so far. The four attackers entered the building and be-
gan ﬁ ring and throwing grenades causing many causalities and damages. They also 
held hundreds of hostages for 3 days. After the security operation all terrorist have 
been killed. However, the total death toll achieved around 70 civilians.77 Al-Shabāb 
took responsibility of the assault and threatened to continue other similar acts in 
the near future. 
The intensiﬁ cation of terrorist actions outside Somalia initiated the debate 
about nationalization or internationalization of Somali jihad, especially in the con-
text of Osama bin Laden’s death, new challenges for worldwide extremists and 
ISIS oﬀ ensive in the Middle East. Al-Shabāb still pledges allegiance to Al-Zawa-
hiri called Emir of Umma and welcomes Al-Qaeda traditions and experiences.78 
However, Omar Hammami also known as Abu Mansour al-Amiriki, the Ameri-
can-born leader of foreign branch in Al-Shabāb opts for transnational character of 
the struggle and recruitment of militants from neighboring and Western countries. 
However, the traditional leader of the organization Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys 
76 S. Huzaifah Alkaﬀ , “Deconstructing al-Shabaab’s Transnational Jihadist Image”, Counter 
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opposes to the idea and presents more nationalist orientation.79 The debate still sep-
arates the two branches and arises concerns about future strategy and operational 
capacities.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in the paper shows that the Arab Spring and growing role 
of various political forces in the revolutionary countries as well as elimination of 
Al-Qaeda leaders changed strategies and goals of jihadist organizations.
In fact, Al-Qaeda becomes more and more theoretical and classic meaning 
or symbol, which is replaced successively by current social and political tendencies 
in the Arab world such as separatism, tribalism or religious schism between Sunni 
and Shia factions. Islamist groups resigned from global aims and activities and con-
centrated on local approaches, which facilitate regional and transregional terrorist 
campaign as well as expansion of inﬂ uences in neighboring countries. The extre-
mist activity in Maghreb, Sahel, West Africa or the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia 
is a good example in that context. For example, Anṣār ash-Sharī῾a and ῾Uqba Ibn 
Nāfi ῾ operate from their bases in Mali, Libya or Chaambi mountains and attack se-
curity forces in Tunisia and Algeria. Besides, Somali Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn carries 
out terrorist attacks in neighboring Kenya, Boko Haram emerges in Cameroon and 
AQAP threats the stability of the Gulf monarchies.   
The research also shows that disintegration of Al-Qaeda branches forced 
diﬀ erent insurgents to search new secure shelters and allies. It is evident in Magh-
reb and Sahel where ﬁ ghters started cooperation with various political forces like 
Tuaregs in Sahara or tribal militias in Libya, Mali, Niger or Nigeria emphasizing 
their autonomy and separation from central governments. Besides, AQAP relies on 
southern Sunni clans opposed to central government and Shia communities in the 
north of the country.
Furthermore, jihadists combine tribalism and separatism with religious dif-
ferences and disproportions. For instance, Iraqi and Syrian Islamists assimilated 
with Sunni communities and expressed their regional and religious identity, which 
is diﬀ erent from Shia domination in the region.
However, the analyses also demonstrate that the jihadists are aﬀ ected by 
three important factors. The ﬁ rst concerns resignation of illegal, violent struggle 
and acceptance of the Islamic theory khurūj ’an al-ḥākim (opposition to the ruler) 
that encouraged some radical Islamists to approve new post-revolutionary autho-
rities declaring Muslim identity of the state. It’s evident in the case of some Salaﬁ  
movements in Egypt like Nour party, which supports Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi and 
states that the new president guaranties stability of the state and Muslim identity of 
the society.
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The second factor reﬂ ects concentration on ﬁ nancial and economic sources. 
The strategy was started by Islamists from Maghreb who based their military and 
logistic capacities on ransoms and smuggling of arms, drugs and goods, especially 
after destruction of Al-Qaeda structures in the north of Maghreb and relocation 
of ﬁ ghters to Sahara. Financial sources are also important for Somali Al-Shabāb 
or Boko Haram extremists who try to control rich territories. Economic interests 
enable to expand political inﬂ uences and aﬀ ect local communities abandoned by 
central governments. It’s evident in the case of ISIS and Al-Baghdadi. The orga-
nization seized crucial Iraqi and Syrian oil and gas ﬁ elds as well as banks or infra-
structures, services and facilities.
However, the third factor regards renaissance of separated Islamists in the 
context of ISIS oﬀ ensive and declaration of the caliphate by Abu Bakr al-Baghda-
di. The conﬂ ict between Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Baghdadi show the crisis be-
tween the old generation of jihadists and young militants expecting new challenges 
and inspirations. Some traditional leaders still sustain allegiance to Al-Zawahiri 
but most of rank-and-ﬁ le commanders started to express their disobedience and fa-
scination of ISIS successful military and ideological campaign. One of the reasons 
is that Al-Baghdadi refers to Al-Qaeda heyday when Osama bin Laden and Ay-
man al-Zawahiri coordinated local branches and inspired diﬀ erent terrorist attacks 
against regional and Western targets. The Dabiq magazine published by ISIS is 
a good example. The style and ideological message of the journal is similar to the 
Inspire magazine issued in the past by Anwar al-Awlaqi, Al-Qaeda representative 
in Yemen. Both journals are published in English and they target Western audience 
thanks to sophisticated graphics, colorful images and short emotional messages.    
Furthermore, ISIS popularity and inﬂ uences rely on appropriate communi-
cation and propaganda channels. They concern traditional, liturgical speeches ad-
dressed to the local audience as well as modern forms of communication such as 
Internet forums, social media or sophisticated journals that aﬀ ect Western volunte-
ers. In this regard, ISIS deﬁ nes a new form of jihadism that threats more and more 
regional and worldwide stability.     
Aktualne tendencje w ruchu dżihadowskim po Arabskiej Wiośnie
Artykuł omawia zjawiska społeczno-polityczne w ruchu dżihadowskim, zachodzące po czte-
rech latach od chwili wybuchu Arabskiej Wiosny w krajach Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu. 
Badania dowodzą, że organizacja Al-Kai’da straciła na znaczeniu, stając się pojęciem coraz bardziej 
teoretycznym i symbolicznym. Likwidacja najważniejszych liderów organizacji i poważne narusze-
nie struktur zmusiło poszczególne grupy do podjęcia nowych działań, umożliwiających prowadzenie 
działalności terrorystycznej. Obecnie islamiści rezygnują z globalnych planów i celów, koncentru-
jąc się na lokalnych i regionalnych uwarunkowaniach społecznych i etnicznych. Samodzielne i au-
tonomiczne działania poszczególnych grup odnoszą się, między innymi, do poszukiwania nowych 
sojuszników i bezpiecznych baz. Przykładem może być intensyﬁ kacja współpracy islamistów z bo-
jownikami tuareskimi na Saharze, separatystami na Synaju oraz libijskimi czy też jemeńskimi mili-
cjami plemiennymi skonﬂ iktowanymi z władzami centralnymi w kraju. Badania zawarte w artykule 
wskazują także dwa główne kierunki aktywności politycznej dżihadystów. Część działaczy zrezygno-
49PRESENT TRENDS AMONG JIHADIST...
wała z działalności terrorystycznej, deklarując swoją lojalność wobec struktur państwa i zachowując 
zarazem swoje konserwatywne poglądy. Druga grupa odrzuca politykę rekoncyliacyjną i radykali-
zuje swoje działania. Przykładem jest wzrost zagrożenia Państwem Islamskim, które zajęło znacz-
ne terytoria w Iraku i Syrii, kontroluje cenne złoża surowców mineralnych i inspiruje ugrupowania 
w innych częściach świata arabsko-muzułmańskiego, zachęcając do lojalności wobec nowego kalifa-
tu i przyłączenia się do trwającego dżihadu.
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